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Circuit Judge Murrah Will Address Graduates
byR. W.Rahn

An honorary degree of Doctor of Laws will be bestowed on Chief
Justice Alfred P. Murrah of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit when he addresses William Mitchell's graduating seniors and their
gue t at the annual commencement exercises. The ommencement will
be lield at the Coll ge of t. Thom Armory on Tu day June 15, at
; 00 p.m . when the 7Q ca.ndida.tes will be escorted from the law chool
lo the Armory by eiaht marshal] elected from the top student of U1e
junior clas .
.Judge Munah , a native of Indian Territory (now Oklal1oma) received hi LL.B. at the University of Oklahoma in 1928, where he was
Phi Beta Kappa and Order of the Coif. He was also a member of Lambda
Chi Alpha Fraternity, and of Phi Alpha Delta legal fraternity, of which
h was - uprcrne Ju tice from 1962 to 1964.
He engaged in general practice in ' rninole Oklahoma, and in klal1oma City until he w appointed to the U. . District Court for tbe
ta te of Oklahoma in l9S7. At aae 3~, he was then the youngest 1J . .
Di trict ,Tud"'e ever to be appointed. In 19-lO, he -was clevat <l to Lhe
. ~. Cout of App als for the Tenth Circuit and in 1959 he became
hi f Judge.
Judge Murrah has b en v ery active in civic, church and community
affair. He wa,s a Yi iting profei ~or of la," at the U11iver ity of Oklalioma
and at Colorado Unive1 ity, Commi ~ioner of Last Frontier Couucil of
Boy couts for over ten year:-. and holder of Lhe ih-er Bea.v r Awa1·d

for djstinguished :,ervice to boyhood; chairman of the O.klahomiL it '
n ited Fund ancl Red Cross from 194 throurn 1954; ha taught ~un da.y ·cbool cla se ince 1940; and has been active in local traffic safety
work and in e tablishi:ng a court for traffi.e offender~ in Oklahoma City
which has become a model for other cities to follow.
Th J udge has a great interest in safety, having served as chairman
of the _"ational Committee for Traffic Safety for three years and participated in safety conferences and institutes in all parts of the nation. He is
also chairman of the Advisory Council of Judges of the National Council
on Crime and Delinquenc~T
He has also been active in the ABA, being past chairman of the
Judicin.1
ction and member of the House of Delegates, and in the
American JudjcaLure ocicty and the American Law I,rtitute. But with
all these activitie , Judue l\Iurrah ~ ma.in. interest ha been. in improving
the admin istration of j1J ticc. A. chairman of the ~ ationaJ Judicial Cou£ercnce Pr>trial ommittee ince 1948, he has work d tire] · ly to educate the bench and bar to the correct and practical uses of these
procedures through seminars, clinics, demonstrations, etc. in practically
every stat .
In l9:5J . he wa awarded th Di ·tinguish d -ervice Citation by the
Uninr ity of Oklahoma for ot1l 'ta11ding
n •ic to the state and the
nation. and al ' o U1 Hattan W. umners Award for outstandina service
0
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ALSA Offers
Student Loans
Augmenting a $50,000 guaranty
fund established last semester in cooperation with the First National
Bank of St. Paul to provide loans
to cover the cost of tuition and
books for Mitchell students, the
American Law Student Association
(ALSA) has recently created the
Fund for Legal Education, considered a major stride in aiding more
law students to finance a legal education.
Beginning in January, 1965 the
ALSA's Fund enables all students
at American Bar Association approved law schools to apply for
loans after completion of one full
year of law study with satisfactory
standing. These loans are available
to the extent of the school's allocation and will be for a maximum of
$1 ,000.00 per year. The minimum
loan amount is $400.00. Borrowers
will sign interim notes accruing simple interest which will be deferred
while the note-maker remains a student in good standing. Arrangements may be made for one of several repayment plans.
Students interested in applying
for an ALSA loan should secure full
information from the Dean.

No. 2

Debt on Building
Nearly Paid Off
By Dave Planting
The .m rt_ga"e debt on William 1\IitcbeTl"s seven-year-old building has
been virh1nll)' wiped out. An am.bitiou · drive launched la. t May raised
$149,000, leaving a b1tlance oI only a f w hundred dollar on Lhe debt.
The funds were donated by 138 alumni, corporations, foundations,
law firms and other friends of the school.
Two contributions exceeded $10,000. They were donated by the
Margaret H. and James E. Kelley "Foundation, Inc., and West Publishing Co. Mr. Kelle_ ·, a ,, illia:m }1itchell alumnus, is a member of the
St. Paul law firm of Bundlie. Kell ~' & Torrison.
The mortgage debt originally was $225,000. Income payments and
several miscellaneous contributions had reduced it to nearly $149,000 by
the time the drive began la t spring.
Tlte 15-year mortgage was held by .M innesota Federal avings and
Loan. D eru1 D ouglas H eidenreich said ifinnesota Federal aved the
chool about $5.000 by a reduc d intere t .rate and by waiving penalties
for prepayments.
Without the donations, the college would have been paying on the
mortgage for the next nine years.
A total of $64,000 in donations was received by William Mitchell
since the last issue of the Opinion was published in December.
"There really aren't words to express fully the college'- deep gratitude for the tremendous effort and
success of the drive," commented
Dean Heidenreich. "William Mitchell indeed can be as proud as it is
Scholarships totaling $2,900 were
fortunate to have so many loyal and
awarded to 10 William Mitchell stugenerous friends."
The drive was headed by former dents on March 4.
They are Robert Rahn, Ronald
Minnesota Supreme Court Justice
Roger L. Dell. Active in soliciting Johnson and Frank O'Meara, fourth
contributions were Harry Holtz, a year students; Richard Knutson,
1943 alumnus and president of the Robert Halva and Joseph Flynn,
First Trust Co., St. Paul; Charles third year students; and Ronald
Murnane, a 1937 alumnus and presi- Erickson, Fred Keiser, Bruce Anderdent of the Minnesota State Bar son and Clifford Gardner, second
Association; and Lee Slater, presi- year students.
The scholarship funds were dodent of West Publishing Co.
Other alumni who aided in the nated by the P. W. Skogmo Foundrive were attorneys Harold J . Car- dation, Minnesota Mutual Founda~
roll, a 1923 alumnus and partner in tion, Minnesota State Bar Foundathe Minneapolis firm of Carroll, tion, Farmers Insurance Group, WilCronan, Roth & Austin; Burr B. liam Mitchell Law Wives, and variMarkham, a 1941 graduate, part- ous law firms and corporations.
ner in Meagher, Geer, Markham & Scholarships were awarded on the
Anderson, also Minneapolis; and basis of scholastic performance and
Richard E. Klein, class of 1949, St. financial need .
Dean H~i(lenreich said that in the
Paul. Prominent among numerous
out-of-town workers were Clem future, an attempt will be made to
Ryan, Brainerd, class of 1920, and raise scholarship funds during the
Leo Seifert, a Fairmont attorney summer, rather than during the first
semester. Grants would then be
and 1916 graduate.
Donors to date are listed on made at the beginning of each academic year.
page 6.

10 Law Students
Get Scholarships

Han oo, Kcllt Phleger & Mulligan Capitol Bound. (See Moot Court, p. S)

Trustees Appoint-

Heidenreich to Per1nanent Dean
D ouglas R. Heidenreich, A.cting Dean of the College since July 1, 1904, recei\•ed a permanent appoint-.
men t o the deanship from the Colleae' Board of
Trustees on Feb. 23, 1965.
Dean Heidenreich, age 33, resides at 1237 Lakeview Avenue, Minneapolis. He stated that the appointment has mefillt little change in his duties, since
he was already the school's chief administrative officer in his acting status. Graduated magna cum laude
from William Mitchell in 1961, Dean Heidenreich engaged in private practice until his appointment as
Assistant Dean o"n March l, 1963.
The new dean declined to outline any plans for
major change . "I have naturally been giving considerable thought to many areas," he commented. "As
yet, however, _it is impossible to know where any
chang might be made."
Job placement bn:s been of some concern to both
him and the students, be said. "We do plan to find

Hon. A. P. Murrah

out from upper classmen what kinds of opportunities
interest them. Even now, we know very little about
the positions our students are seeking."
Dean Heidenreich also plans to inform third-year
students about the necessity for making early applications for po itions with law furn . This plan res ults
in part from a poll of the senior which indicated that
at the tart of their final "em _ter very few of them
had made arra:ngcmeuts for a job upon graduation.
• nother long-range o-oal is a comprehensi,·e curr iculum revie"-· "We w0uld like to make mor electives available to lower classmen," the dean said. "Our
seniors have had some choice of courses this year, but
we'd like to extend this option to the other classes."
The new orporations prof orship created by a
Hill Foundation grant has also taken much of th
deans attention. He predicted that the full-time po
would be filled within a short time, possibly before the
end of the school year.
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EDITORIAL:

Freedom and the Fourth Estate
There'll be IIO queuina at the te for vou this ummer if vou're a
lawyer whose client is hapl
enough to ~ome under the gaz; of the
c°:11-p:ting news media to any marked degree. Even if hi plight · conc1cnt.iously reported you'll fin.cl your elf at the eye of an old but never
more active maeslstrom: How to balance the fundamental and constitutionally protected rights of fair trial and free press.
The Oswald debacle ba accentuated the _problem for the public, although it ha Jong concerned re..._sponsible leader in the legal and jou:rnali
t ic profe sion . Harvard Law· School Dean. Erwin Griswold for example
ha~ publicly declared that O wald was 'convicted" in new paper and on
IT creen and ·ould never ha e had a fair trial anywhere in America.
With pa t sifted tln-ouah, pro ecutors .interviewed and guilt assUIDed, numerous defend.ll.Ilts of a more conventional character hav e faced
juries fatally prejudiced at the hand of the Fouth Estate. Is it hyperbole
to say that slowly becoming engrained in Our Way of Life is the terrible
and unwhispered principle that the fair administration of criminal and
civil justice takes a close second place to the public's taste for the morbid
and thirst for the facts?
A dialogue between the professions of journalism and the law has
gone on for over seventy years, each side often appearing more interested
in ascribing blame than in finding a solution. Joint attempts made in
19 5. "1937. and 1953 to draft a voluntary code all ca.me to naught. Today, numerou law-pres. eminar are in es ion in many states and the
A oci.a tion of American Law chool 11a ct up an advi o:ry committee
of experts to help explain
. uprcme Court opinions to the working
pre s. In the meantime, the Federal Communications Commission has no
rules or regulations controJJing abuses in this area, and is in fact expressly
prohibited from exercising the power of censorship over broadcast material. The N atio11.al Association of Broadcasters sponsors a voluntary
code of good practices for the television industry, but its standards are
broad and no attempt has been made to deal with the problem directly.
Talk of legislation in this area aives journali ts spa-vin and jurists
chills. Justice Bernard Meyer of the New York upreme Court, however .
ha- everal times uggesled that it may not be uncon titutional to adopt
a latute re tricting pres handling of criminal new~ to in ure a fafr
trial. Reasons Justice Meyer: To state the conflict between fair trial
requiTemen
and free p ress protection is to acknowledge that both
cannot be absolute rights. He concludes that 'neither righL is ab olute,
that the intere · on both sides must be balanced and that the conclusion
of any balancing based on reason must be that to the extent necessary
to protect the individuals' right to fair trial, specific limitations of the
free press right are constitutionally permissible."
A spokesman for the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Herbert B ruc.ke. disagree . The p res. onn publish anything it wishe , he cont nds, ubject onl to the penalty for libel. A.t the end of the pcctrum is
J"u tice Hugo Black, who has bint d that in hi_ opinion even th e law of
libel might be held to be an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom
of the press.
Frank tanton P rej dent of CBS, thinks a tatute specifying what
c_a nnot be published or broadcast i "a temptin g pro pect becau e it appears swift and _weeping. ' E ve-n if con titutional however (and there
seems to be little question that an effective constitutional statute can be
dmfted) ucb a statute in Mr. Stanton's eyes would generate far more
critical problem··, such as imposing upon the courts the problem of
policing the -pre s.
While talk goes on in every quarter, the "clear and present danger"
principal enunciated by Holmes in Schenck v. United States (together
with contempt and libel remedies) continues to offer our only guidelines
for curbing abuses by the press. There are, of course, a number of
available correctives-postponement of trial, change of venue, waiver of
jury, jury lock-ups, voir dire questioning of jury candidates, or standing
trial and seeking reversal later. Some of these proposals are solutions
after the event, or limited rights; most are costly and circuitous; all are
abdications of the problem and poor substitutes for a preventive remedy.
Suppression externally imposed on one class as a means of guaranteeing
or amplifying constitutional rights of another is no new notion in American law. The alternative-intra-professional regulation self-imposed by
the professions-is obvious and preferable.
In the fifty-odd years that Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics ("Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated
litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the courts and otherwise
prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be
condemned ...") has existed, there hasn't been one reported proceeding
against an offending lawyer, prosecutor or judge.
Neither has the press in the past shown any great altruism or eagerness to abandon its role as money maker, although its avowed function
in doing so is to keep a democratic people informed for decision making.
Ironically, it is often the aptness, latitude and mobility of the press
in pursuit of the public weal which now demands restraint and cure .
The need for reconciliation of these competing principles of journalistic freedom and the proper administration of justice has never been
more compelling. Unless the press and the bar can voluntarily achieve
effective policing of their respective professions, it is not unreasonable
to expect definite legislative standards appearing as embodiment of what
are today merely murmurs in the outposts.
J.E.C.

in the administration of justice in
the southwest. In 1957 he was honored by the National Conference of
Christians and Jews of Oklahoma,
and in 1959 was chosen for induction into the Oklahoma Hall of
Fame. He is also a member of the
board of trustees of Southern
Methodist University.
Preceeding the graduation, on
Friday evening, June 11 at 8: 00
p.m., the seniors and their wives
and parents will be entertained at
the traditional Senior Class Party,
at which time wives or mothers of
the seniors will be presented with
appropriate letters of appreciation
recognizing their part in sustaining
the candidates during four difficult
years of study. Minnesota Supreme
Court Justice Tom Gallagher, father
of graduating senior Michael J. Gallagher, will address this gathering .
The 72 members of the 1965
graduating class
are: Donald L.
Andersen, Minneapolis; Allan
S. Anderson ,
Minneapolis;
Jerome T. Anderson, St. Paul;
Oliver F. Arrett,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
Bloomington;
THOMAS GALLAGHER
Larry D. Buegler, St. Paul; Robert S. Burke, St.
Paul; Asa E. Buttrick, White Bear
Lake; Carolyn A. Cochrane, St.
Paul; Robert F. Collins, South St.
Paul; Lawrence R. Commers, Minneapolis.
Emmett D. Dowdal, St. Paul;
Eleanor M. Earle, St. Paul; Ronald C. Evans, St. Paul; Alan W .
Falconer, Richfield; Leo J. Fogarty,
St. Paul; Thomas W. Foley, Minneapolis; Michael J. Gallagher, Minneapolis; Richard J. Grass, St. Paul;
Robert W. Gyurci, St. Paul; Charles
R. Hall, New Brighton; Samuel L.
Hanson, St. Paul; Gene F. Happe,
Minneapolis; Michael J. Healey, St.
Paul; Donald J. Heffernan, St. Paul;
Adrian E. Herbst, Richfield; John
R . Holte, Minneapolis.
Clark F. Isaacs, St. Paul; Ronald
F. Johnson, St. Paul; Errol K. Kantor, Minneapolis; John F. Kelly, St.
Paul; William D. Kenyon, North St.
Paul; Joseph A. Klimek, Bloomington; Thomas R. Lacy, Bloomington;
Robert E. Larson, Anoka; Fred R.
Long, St. Paul; John E. McKendrick, Edina; Thomas J. McLeod,
St. Paul; James M. Mahoney, St.
Paul; William F. Messerli, Minneapolis; Dennis J. Morgeson, Edina;
Allan E. Mulligan, St. Louis Park;
Thomas W. Murray, St. Paul.
Louis E. Navin, St. Paul; Dewey
M. Nelson, Minneapolis; Frank J .
O'Meara, St. Paul; Patrick H. O'Neill, St. Paul; John A. Page, Crystal; Gerald W. Pahl, West St. Paul;
Philip R. Perkins, St. Paul; Barry L.
Peterson, Minneapolis; David L.
Peterson, St. Paul; Merwin W. Peterson, Minneapolis; Richard Petrowski, Minneapolis; Gary L. Phleger,
St. Louis Park; Charles H. Potter,
Minneapolis; William H. Queenan,
St. Paul; Robert W. Rahn, Edina;
Alvin J. Remmenga, Minneapolis;
Russell T. Roe, Edina; Robert J .
Schaefer, Richfield; Carl W. Schoch,
St. Paul; Arthur W. Seaberg, St.
Paul; Donald R. Sjostrom, Minneapolis; Douglas W. Snyder, Minneapolis; Emory A. Solie, Fridley;
Richard R. Solie, Minneapolis; Frederick W. Spencer, Minneapolis;
David A. Streed, Minneapolis; Leonard T. Street, St. Paul; James R.
Stuart, St. Paul; William 0. White,
Minneapolis; and Ronald E. Wills,
St. Paul.
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BY THE DEAN
We here at William Mitchell sometimes take for granted the tremendous desire and enthusiasm and the extraordinary abilities of our student .
I review the lisl of the members of the 1965 graduating class,
I realize they represent a tremendou wealth of t alent energy, and ambition -..,~hic.h i about to beco~e a,ailable to the legal profession in the
tate of finn ota.
The 72 members of this class have a variety of backgrounds. Some entered law schol right after college, although most of them had spent time
in the service or working before beginning the study of law. All these
men have a seriousness and singularity of purpose that has carried them
through the trials of law school; they have seen others who started with
them slacken their pace and finally wilt under the pressure of heavy
assignments and a demanding academic schedule. The lazy, the slow, and
the ill-prepared have long since fallen out of the race.
The members of the class of 1965 have come from many parts of the
state of Minnesota; they have attended many colleges at the undergraduate level; they come from both urban and rural areas; they profess a
variety of political philosophies and religious creeds. But they have certain things in common.
Select at random any name from the list of 1965 graduates and vou
will likely find that you have chosen a man who is approximately. 30
years of age, who is married and who has a family. He has gone through
law school under his own power, perhaps with the helping of a working
wife or occasional scholarship funds. He is likely to be a man holding a
responsible position with a Twin Cities corporation or perhaps an adjuster or accountant of some years experience. He may have great experience in the fields of taxation, labor relations, or patents. Almost certainly
he will have a background of several years of business or employment
experience in the community. He probably has his military training behind him and he may have served in the Korean conflict.
He is a man who has spent the past four years working the equival~nt of two full-time jobs. He has given up a great deal of his social life;
his weekends have been spent in study and preparation for class. Perhaps he has been beset at some time during the past four years by some
personal problem, financial problem or illness. Nevertheless, the occasional
discouraging set-backs only have served to strengthen his resolve and he
has succeeded in solving his problem and overcoming his disadvantage.
He has completed a program, the basic philosophy of which is that
the evening law student must stand on his own feet, solve his own problems and meet the unbending demands of the law school curriculum. No
concessions have been made to him during his course of study. If he was
not a mature, thoughtful individual at the time that he entered law
·chool he ha certainly become one during his four ears of training.
H e will tcll you that he owes a _great debt to his wife. and family who
have acrificed as much a he has.
it.bou t their cooperation he· could
not have ucceeded. He i a member of the elect group of 52 % of the
class which entered in 1961 wliich survive~ to graduate in J une 0£ 1965.
He is now ready to step from law school into the legal profession.
Some of these men will stay with their present employers; some will
enter the active practice of law; still others will go into business. Many
of those who practice law will seek jobs with Twin Cities firms but
many will go to the suburbs or to rural areas. Some will practice with
large firms, some with small firms, and some will work for corporations.
Whatever they do, these men will bring with them a sincere love of the
law and an overwhelming desire to succeed.
The tremendous talent and demonstrated ability of these men offer to
the legal profession and to the people of Minnesota a most valuable asset.
These men have good reason to be proud of themselves. William Mitchell
College of Law is proud of them!

Five-year Survey Slietches
Graduate Profile
By Bill Glew
What Mitchell grads are up to is
a tale partly told by the following
statistics. They're the result of a
recent survey in which graduates of
the last five years were questioned
concerning their present location,
type of employment and income!
Approximately 40% responded .
Replies were received from 49% of
the class of 1960, 37% of each
of the classes of 1961, 1962, 1963,
and 41 % of the class of 1964 .
Most graduates have remained in
the Twin City area according to the
survey. An average shows 71 %
located in the Twin Cities, 21 % in
other Minnesota communities, and
8% in other states .
The survey showed a definite preference for employment as a sole
practitioner or with a small firm
(five members or less). These two
groups include 67 graduates or 46%
of all those responding to the questionnaire. Of this number, 24 are
practicing by themselves and 43
are with small firms.
Twenty-six graduates are employed by corporations, 15 by govern-

menl, 1.0 by medium size law firm
(6-12 members ) . and 1 by large
la.w firm (13 or more members) .
Four graduate~ are employed by
a bank or tru t company and one is
in militar y ervice. Fifteen gwdua te ar in other nelds.
The gra-duate of recent years reported a lower propor tion of their
cla.s, mployed with a small firm
or a a sole practitioner than did
ear]jer gra duate· . The per cent indicating employment in th e two
categorjes was: Cla. - of 1964- S7%
class of I 963-S9 % class oi 196249 % , cla.s of 1961- 5~%, cla- of
1960-60% .
Annual income ot between ::'10,000 an.cl ,, 15,000 was reported by
32% of all graduat who replied to
the questionnaire.
Grad uates were asked to .indicate
income in one of the following five
area : under 5,000 · :5 000 to. 7 500;
"i ..500 to 'J0,000· 10,000 to -'15000; and over 815,000. Th replies
indicate a trend toward concenl:ration in th ·1.0,000 to 15,000 range.
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Religion and Governlllen t
By Ronald F. Johnson

terest of the government which
clashed with the students' religious
freedom was the furthering of "national unity" among young people
in the time of war. This is certainly
a valid and substantial governmental interest even if it is not sufficiently strong to permit a violation of the
pupils' constitutional rights. The defendant school authorities contended in the Sheldon case that allowing
plaintiffs not to conform would
create a "disciplinary problem ."
This interest of the school authorities is certainly anemic when compared with the national interest in
time of war and is certainly not a
substantial enough interest to outI weigh the rights guaranteed to the
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - pupils by the first amendment. Thus
compel him to utter what is
the protected constitutional rights
of the pupils are virtually identical
not his mind.
The practical effect of this case is in the Sheldon and Barnette cases.
that freedom of religion is protected The only valid distinction is the
similarly to freedom of speech which interest of the government. Since
is also protected by the first amend- the interest of the government set
forth in the Barnette case is stronger
ment.
Almost exactly twenty years af- than in the Sheldon case, the Shelter publication of the Barnette case, don case is easily within the standthe United States District Court ards set by the Supreme Court in
in Arizona decided Sheldon v. Fan- 1943.
Just how important must the innin,1 a case with facts strikingly
similar to the Barnette case. In the terest of the government be in order
Sheldon case the statutes of Arizona to permit the suppression of the
provided that the state superin- right to "free exercise' of religion?
tendant of public education shall That there are such vaild interests
"prepare for use in the public schools appears in an 1890 case involving a
a program providing for a salute to criminal prosecution for polygamy.n
the flag and other patriotic exercises, as meet the requirements of
the different grades." 8 In compliance with this statute and in conjunction with their duty to provide
a course in music, the defendant
School Board and Arizona State
Board of Education had prescribed
that as a part of general school assemblies students shall be required
to stand during the singing of the
National Anthem. Their refusal to
stand was based on the refusal of
the ancient Hebrew children Shadrach, Meshack and Abendnego to
obey the express orders of King
Nebuchadnezzar to bow down at
the sound of musical instruments
playing patriotic-religious music in
ancient Babylon. 9 The plaintiffs
were of compulsory school age and
the school authorities expelled them
solely for their refusal to stand during the singing of the National Anthem. Their parents also faced prosecution for the violation of Arizona's
school laws. The plaintiffs sought
and the Federal District Court
awarded an injunction restraining
the defendant school board from
excluding the plaintiffs from attending school.
The court held that there was no
"establishment of religion" as the
plaintiff had alleged. The court
stated that the singing of the National Anthem is primarily a patriotic ceremony and any reference to
religion is only incidental and merely expressive of a religious faith Therein the Supreme Court upheld
which is a historic fact. The deci- the conviction against the alleged
sion was thus based solely on the defense that the defendant's reli"free exercise" clause of the first gious freedom was being violated by
amendment. The court stated that stating:
the sincerity or reasonableness of
It was never intended or supthe claim that their refusal was
posed that the Aniendm.ent
based upon religious grounds "may
should be invoked as a prohinot be examined by this or any
bition against legislation for
other court." 10
the punishment of acts inimi·
Two principal factors distinguish
cal to the peace, good order
the Sheldon case from the Barnette
and morals of society.12
case. One is that in the Sheldon
Recent decisions involving Sunday
case the students were not required closing laws show that the Supreme
to speak (or sing) but only to stand Court still thinks it is just to put
during the time the National An- some restraint on an individual's
them was being sung. It should not religious freedom. 13 In Braunfeld v.
matter if the act they are required Brown the petitioners were members
to perform is singing, speaking or of the Orthodox Jewish faith and in
merely standing silently. It is not accord with their religious beliefs
the act itself but the fact that they kept their retail stores closed from
are being compelled to do an act sun-down on Friday through suncontrary to their beliefs that en- down on Saturday. They made up
croaches upon the "free exercise" of for the loss of business on their
their religion. The other distinction /Sabbath by remaining open on Sunis that in the Barnette case the in- day. A Pennsylvania statute 14 en-

Between 1938 and 1943 there was
About the Author
an extension and redefinition of the
Ron Johnson is a fourth year stupersonal rights protected by the
first amendment. This change came dent residing in St. Paul. A graduate of the Univerabout largely because of persistent
sity of Minnesota,
resort to the courts by the religious
sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses.
he has been emDuring this period no fewer than
ployed as a legal
thirty-one cases involving Jehovah's
assistant by the
Witnesses were heard by the United
Inheritance Tax
States Supreme Court (with sixteen
Division of the
deciding decisions). Commenting on
Minnesota Tax
this wave of cases in March, 1944,
Department for
a retired judge wrote:
Johnson
the past three
years. Ron is 26
It is plain that present conyears old, married, and the father
stitutional guarantees of perof three children.
sonal liberty, as authoritatively
interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, are far broader
than they were before the
spring of 1938 . . .1

Two of these cases contested the
constitutional authority of a school
board to expel from public elementary schools children of members of
Jehovah's Witnesses whose religious
belief led them to refuse to salute
the flag of the United States and to
recite the familiar "Pledge of Allegiance." In the Gobitis 2 case decided in 1940, the Supreme Court
upheld the expulsion of Jehovah's
Witnesses children by the school
board in Virginia. The court, speaking by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
weighed the personal rights of the
children against the attempt by the
school board to promote the national
cohesion and unity regarded to be
so essential to national security . Mr.
Justice Frankfurter pointed out that
the flag is the "symbol of national
unity, transcending all internal differences, however large, within the
framework of the Constitution . ... "
He stated, in substance, that this
was a matter within legislative authority, and that bringing it into the
judicial arena would, in effect, make
the United States Supreme Court a
school board for the nation.
The second of the two cases
clearly shows a great change from
the original approach to this question by th
upreme Cou rt, an approa.ch whlch was first ta.ken "-)uch
be"IID during those year ·. T he Gobitis ca. e wa eA-pre sly OYettnled by
West Virginia Board of Education
v. Barnette.' Again pupils were expelled from chool for refusing to
al uLe th~ flag. althm1oh they would
stand duriua tlie ceremony . Their
refu. al wa ba ed on their literal
interpretation of Exodus, Chapter
20, verses 4 and 5. 4
The Supreme Court held that the
right of religiou freedom a-uaranteed bv the fir t amendmenl 6 were
appli~ble to the action by t he
tate through the 'due proces
and 'equal protectio,n" clau
of
the fourte nth amend ment. It was
held that the attainment of national unity and security, although
desirable "ends," could not be attained at the expense of religious
freedom. Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out that a limited government is
not necessarily a weak government.
He gave an indication of what the
State's interest would have to be
by stating:
It is now commonplace that
censorship or suppression of
expression is tolerated by our
constitution only when the expression presents a clear and
present danger of action of a
kind the state is empowered to
prevent and punish. It would
seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only
on even more immediate and
urgent grounds than silence ...
To sustain the compulsory
:flag salute we are required to
say that a Bill of Rights, which
guards the individual's right to
speak his own mind, left it
open to public authorities to

acted in 1959 made it a crime for
them to remain open on Sunday.
The storekeepers asserted that they
did one-third of their weekly business on Sunday and that they
could not remain closed on both
Saturday and Sunday and still remain in business. If they were to
obey the statute they were put to
the dilemma of forsaking either
their livelihood or their religious
dictates. Mr. Chief Justic Warren
in writing the opinion of the Court
called this an indirect burden on the
"free exercise" of their religion
which "does not make unlawful the
religious practice itself." He summed up the majority opinion by
stating that the storekeeper's choice:

tiff was a member of the Seventhday Adventist faith and recognized
Saturday as her day of worship.
When her employer changed from a
five to a six day week, requiring her
to work on Saturday, she quit her
job and applied for unemployment
compensation benefits. The South
Carolina Employment Security Commission ruled that she was not qualified for unemployment benefits because she failed, without good cause,
to accept "suitable work when offered . . . by the employment office or the employer . . . " In the
Sherbert case as in the Braunfeld
case, the citizen has to face the difficult choice between his religious
beliefs and his livelihood. The
• . • retaining their present
"right" in each case is thus subsoccupations and incurring ecotantially the same. If the cases are
nomic disadvantage or engagto be distinguished it must be on
ing in some other commercial
the grounds that the public inactivity which does not call for
terests set forth in the Braunfeld
either Saturday or Sunday la·
decision are substantially stronger
bor-may well result in some
than the policy considerations presfinancial sacrifice in order to
ented by the facts in the Sherbert
observe their religious beliefs,
case. The Braunfeld case involved
still the option is wholly differthe interest of the State to proclaim
ent than when the legislation
a uniform day of rest for all the
attempts to make a religious
citizens. But the Supreme Court depractice itself unlawful."
clares that the State in the Sherbert
The dissent by Mr. Justice Bren- case could suggest:
nan quoted from the Barnette case.
. . . no more than a possiHe felt that although the state had
bility that the filing of fraudua legitimate basis for the statute
lent claims by unscrupulous
that it was not sufficient to prevail
claimants feigning religious obagainst the weighty constitutional
jections to Saturday work
might not only dilute the un.em p loym en t compensation
fund but also hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work.17

The Minnesota Supreme Court
recently decided a case involving
a different type of governmental
interest.1 " The petitioner in In re
Jemson was a woman who refused
to serve on a ,jury on religious
grounds. Her refusal was based on
her interpretation of the biblical
passage, "judge not, that you will
not be judged." For her refusal to
serve the trial judge held her in
contempt of court and sentenced
her. The Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the conviction, reasoning that the imposition on her religious freedom was slight when
compared with her civic duty to
serve on the jury. Jury service is
certainly a substantial and necessary interest of the government.
Along with the rights and privileges
given to the people, and limiting
the power of the government, the
people owe certain duties to the
government. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari
and vacated the judgment of the
Minnesota court "in light of" the
Sherbert case which was decided after the Minnesota decision. 19
Thus the Supreme Court concluded that in requiring jury service that the interest of the State
was not sufficient to warrant an inright. This was doubly so because vasion of the woman's free exercise
he felt that Pennsylvania had an
(Cont'd on p. 6, col. 4)
easy constitutional alternative (letting those who worshiped on a day 1 Edward F. Waite, 28 Minn. L. Rev.
246.
other than Sunday use that day as 209.
2 Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
their day of rest and remain open 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
a 319 U.S. 624.
on Sunday.)
• " Thou shalt not make unto thee any
;,raTcn
. or :l.JIY Ukeness of nnyThe main interest of the State tbin,;r thaimage
t I 1n heaven abov>i. or that fs
in the Braunfeld case was to pro- In the earth beneath, o r that is ln the
water under the earth; thou shalt not
vide a day of rest. The rationale bow down thyself to them nor serve
them ."
wa3 that the day of rest is best ·s U.S. CONST. AMEND. I, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment
provided for by one uniform day of
religion, or prohibiting the free exerwhen all commercial activity, ex- cise thereof."
• 319 U.S. 624. 633-34,
cept that which is necessary, should 7 Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766
Ariz. 1963).
come to a halt, thus creating as (D.s ARIZ.
REV. STAT. No. 15-1031.
• Dani.el 3 :13-28.
complete a reprieve as possible from
10 221 F. Supp. 766, 771.
the anxieties and fast pace of the 11 Davis v. Benson, 13& U.S. 333 (1890).
12 Id. at 342.
working days of the week:
1 • Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
The Braunfeld case did not, how- (1961). Galla.gllcr v. Crown Kosher Market,
366
U.S.
~90
(1961).
ever, put a halt to the trend to- 14 18 Purdon's PA.
STAT. ANN. (1960
ward an increased judicial recogni- Cum. Supp.) No. 4699 .10.
15 Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 13,
tion of the individuals' constitu- at 606.
1 • Sherbert
v . Verner, 374 U.S. 398
tional rights. Sherbert v . Verner
(1903).
decided less than a year ago cuts 1, Id. at 407.
deeply into the Court's reasoning 1 • In re Jenison, 120 N.W. 2d 515
(Minn .. 1963).
in the Braunfeld decision. The Plain19In re Jenison, 84 S. Ct. 63 (1963) .
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The Greatest Outlaw the West Has Ever Known ...
By Alvin J. Remmenga
Cursed by steamboat captains of
the 1800s and later called "the
greatest outlaw the West has ever
known," 1 the Missouri River for
decades has shown small respect for
people or property lines.
Its heyday was a century ago,
when a $15,000 side-wheeler steamboat could earn $80,000 in a single
trip to Montana with a load of passengers, chickens, and whisky-unless an underwater snag sank the
whole outfit. But then the railroads
and highways slithered across the
nation, grabbed the freight trade,
and the Missouri became an unwanted daughter of Nature, left to
flip her muddy skirts about during
her almost annual flooding spree.
Her silt-laden waters earned her the
title, "Big Muddy," and author
Mark Twain once complained the
river was "too wet to plow and too
dry to drink." 2
At "high tide"-as Omahans jokingly called it during the 1952 flood
-the Missouri's angTy waters sometimes churned for 20 miles or more
across the boundary lines between
Nebraska, Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas. And where she finally settled
down to rest, was not always where
she had awakened.
Today, an $11-billion network of
dams and pilings has just about
tamed the wild Missouri; but the
courts and others are still picking
up the pieces. And while another
major flood on the river is unlikely,
her wanderings have started what
could be a major change in the traditional policy against permitting
courts to act beyond their jurisdiction.'
Two recent court cases that
stemmed from the bad behavior of
the Missouri make it clear that traditional jurisdiction of land-that is,
that only the courts of the state in
which land is situated have the power to determine title to the land-is
open to attack if the question is litigated and the court decides it has
jurisdiction.
In one case, Duke v. Durfee; the
river channel, the middle of which
formed the Missouri- Nebraska
boundary line, shifted so that about
200 acres of land, once an island in
the river, was on the Missouri side
rather than the Nebraska side of
the original boundary. Two Nebraska citizens, one of whom was Durfee and who claimed the land by
virtue of a Nebraska sheriff's tax
foreclosure deed, brought suit in
1956 in the District Court of Richardson County, Nebraska, against
a Missouri citizen, Duke, who claimed the land through a Missouri
swampland patent.
Although Duke was not personally within the jurisdiction of the
Nebraska court, he appeared and a
principle issue litigated was whether
the shift in the rivers course resulted
from avulsion-a rapid shift in the
main channel-so that under Nebraska law the land remained a part
of Nebraska, or from accretion, so
that the land became a part of Missouri. The Nebraska court found
that the shift in the river's course
resulted from avulsion, that it had
jurisdiction of the parties-since
Duke appeared in the action-and
the subject matter, and that the
land was in Nebraska. The court,
therefore, quieted title in the Nebraska citizen.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska
affirmed, and the Missouri citizenDuke-did not appeal. Instead, he

1 Duke v.
Durkee, 215 F. Supp. 901,
906 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
• American Mercury, June 1960, p. 94.
• Work Boat, Dec. 81, 1956, p. 57.
• Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457
(1874). See also Restatement. Judgments ,
10 (1942). "Where a court has jurlsdl<.~
tion over the parties and determines that
it ha.s jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the parties cannot collaterally attack the
judgment on the ground that the court
did not have jurisdiction over the subject

brought a similar action against the
Nebraska citizens in a Missouri
state court, from which it was removed to the Missouri federal court .
That court, although agreeing with
Duke that the land was in Missouri, dismissed the second suit on
the ground that the Nebraska judgment was res judicata and binding
on the Missouri court.•
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the district
court was not required to give full
faith and credit 7 to the Nebraska
judgment, that normal res judicata
principles were not applicable because the controversy involved land,
and that the Missouri court was free
to retry the issue of the Nebraska
court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter.•
On certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed." Joined by seven other
members of the Court, Justice Stewart held that when the location of
the land was fully and fairly litigated and judicially determined by
the Nebraska state courts, it could
not be retired in another state in litigation between the same parties.
In the second case. Schroeder v .
Land,10 the property in question was
formerly on the west or Iowa side
of the Missouri River, the original
boundary line between Nebraska
and Iowa. However, an eastward
shift of the river caused the land to
be on the west or Nebraska side,
and the Iowa-Nebraska Boundary
Compact of 1943 placed the land
under Nebraska jurisdiction.
Later, the federal government began proceedings to condemn the
land for use in stabilizing the river
channel and deposited $11,470 with
the Nebraska federal district court
pending determination of title in the
land.
John Schroeder, Roy M . Harrop,
and the Homestead Corporation intervened in the condemnation proceeding and asserted ownership of
the land on the basis of tax deeds
issued to them upon a 1952 judgment of an Iowa state court, finding them to be the owners. The
opposing claimants, Ned and Irma
Tyson, who were not parties to the
Iowa suit, claimed title under a 1960
judgment of the District Court of
Washington County, Nebraska, resulting from an attempt by Schroeder and Harrop to register and enforce the 1952 Iowa judgment in
Washington County.11
The Nebraska federal court, however, found that the 1960 adjudication was conclusive and dispositive
of the title issue and that the Tysons were entitled to the money on
deposit with the court.12
That judgment was appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, with the appellants admitting the land was on

the Nebraska side of the 1943 stabilized river channel but contending
that the only authorized survey
showed it to be in Iowa. The appellants also contended that the federal district court should have made
collateral inquiry into the jurisdiction of the Nebraska state courts
because they failed to recognize the
Iowa ratification act of the 1943
compact, providing that titles good
in Iowa should be good in Nebraska
as to any lands Iowa might cede to
Nebraska, and because the Nebraska state courts failed to give full
faith and credit to the 1952 Iowa
state court judgment.
In so arguing. the appellants relied almost entirely upon the ruling
of the Eighth Circuit court in Duke
v . Durfee 13 that the Missouri federal court had the power to make
collateral inquiry into the jurisdictional basis of a Nebraska judgment
that land in dispute was situated in
Nebraska.
The Court of Appeals, however,
ruled in Schroeder that the judgment of the Nebraska courts was
conclusive on the question of ownership of the land and the federal
district court was without the power to make collateral inquiry into
the jurisdiction of the Nebraska
state courts.14 The court did so on
the ground that, unlike Duke, the
parties attacking the jurisdiction of
the Nebraska state courts were the
same parties who originally invoked that jurisdiction and had had
their day in court, and, even if that
distinction was not present, the 1943
boundary compact established that
the land was in Nebraska. Paraphrasing Pennoyer v . Nefj,15 the
court added that every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over property within its
territory, and ·no state can exercise
direct jurisdiction over property
outside its territory. Therefore, the
existing final judgment on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by
a court of competent jurisdiction is,
under the doctrine of res judicata,
conclusive of rights, questions, and
facts in issue as to the parties in
all other actions in the same or
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.
While there are significant differences in the fact situations of the
Schroeder and Duke cases, the rulings from the same circuit in the
two cases appear a bit in opposition. The court in Duke showed little hesitation in saying that the
jurisdiction found by the Nebraska
courts could be collaterally attacked in the Missouri courts. Yet, in
Schroeder, the court was equally
forward in saying that the finding
of Nebraska jurisdiction could not
be collaterally attacked, and its reasoning that the Iowa parties had
had their day in court is surprisely
similar to Justice Stewart's later
opinion in the Duke reversal.
It is true that in Schroeder there
was a boundary compact that
placed the land in Nebraska, but
the Eighth Circuit's opinion indicates it would have come to the
same conclusion even without the
compact. Had the court in Schroe'der had the benefit of the Supreme
Court's later opinion in Duke, it, of
course, would have had no difficulty
in reaching its result-boundary
agreement or not and perhaps even
if the compact had placed the land
in Iowa.
·
Even so, the Court in Duke was
careful to point out that nothing

matter. unJ.e.· the polic~· underlying the
doctrin e of res judlcata is 0111:weii:hed bv
the policy against permitting the. court
act beyond its jurisdiction."
0 108 Neb. 2;2. 95 :-1 .'W .2d 01
( l..959) .
• 21.5 F . ugp . 001. Accord. Chicot County Dralnnge I bict ,•. Baxter tote llank,
30 U.S . 3,l. $7, (1 0~0 ).
'U. . OIU!t. art. JV, 9. "Full FA1U1
antl Credit 5hall be !"h•en to t.l rc public
Act . Recor ds. and Judicial .P.roce.edlngs
nf every other tale . .And Ute Con.:µ-e

• Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Record and Pro- Cir. 1962).
• Duke v. Durfee, 11 L .Ed.2d 186 (1963).
ceedings shall h!l proved, and the Effect
10 318 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1963).
thereof." This rule of the Constitution was
11 Schroeder
v. Homestead Corp., 171
extended to all courts, federal as well as
state, by the Acts of June 25, 1948, ch. Neb. 792, 107 N.W.2d 750 (1961); Schroeder
v.
Williams,
868 U.S. 32 (1961).
646, 62 Stat. 947. Aocord, Huron Holding
12 Schroeder v. Land, 206 F. Supp. 322
Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co .• 312 (D. Neb. 1962).
U.S. 183 (1941); United States v. Land.
13 215 F. Supp. 901.
206 F. Supp. 322 (D. Neb. 1962); Gostin
u 318 F.2d 311 .
rn 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
v. Nelson, 213 F. Supp. 164 (D. Del. 1962) .
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decided between the litigants could
bind either Missouri or Nebraska
with respect to any controversy
they might have over the location
of the boundary between them or
as to their respective sovereignty
over the land in question. Justice
Black, in a concurring opinion, even
urged that Duke should not be
bound by the Nebraska judgment
if the two states later determined
the land was in Missouri.
Do these two cases indicate that
jurisdiction of land perhaps is losing a bit of its sacred character, or
will their holdings go down the river
with the Missouri's floods?
If history has a lesson, the result
may be the former. The Supreme
Court in Duke put it this way:
; . . while it is established
that a court in one State, when
asked to give effect to the
judgment of a court in another
state, may constitutionally inquire into the foreign court's
jurisdiction to render that
judgment, the modern decisions of this Court have carefully delineated the permissible scope of such an inquiry.
From these decisions there
emerges the general rule that
a judgment is entitled to full
faith and eredit--even as to
questions of jurisdiction when the second court's inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided
in the court which rendered the
original judgment.16

With respect to jurisdiction over
the person, this principle was forcefully established in Baldwin v. Iowa
State Travelling Men's Association.17
There it was held that a federal
court in Iowa must give binding effect to the judgment of a federal
court in Missouri, despite the claim
that the original court did not have
jurisdiction over the defendants person, once it was shown to the court
in Iowa that the question had been
fully litigated in the Missouri forum.
Said Justice Roberts in that case:
Public policy dictates that
there be an end of litigation;
that those who have contested
an issue shall he bound by the
result of the contest, and that
matters once tried shall be
considered forever settled as
between parties. We see no reason why this doctrine should
not apply in every case where
one voluntarily appears, presents his case and is fully
heard, and why he should not
in the absence of fraud, be
thereafter concluded by the
judgment of the tribunal to
which he has submitted his
cause.18

be tried in a subsequent action between the parties. In Treines v.
Sunshine Mining Co.,,,,, the Court
said flatly:
One trial of an issue is
enough. The principles of res
judicata apply to questions of
jurisdiction as well as to the
other issues, as well to jurisdiction of the subject matter
as of the parties.21

Yet, the general rule under the
full faith and credit clause that
every state must give to a judgment at least the res .judicata effect
it would have in the state that rendered it is not without exceptions.
The Court in the Duke case carefully stated that the doctrine of
federal pre-emption or sovereign
immunity may sometimes override
the conclusiveness of jurisdictional
determinations.
But should such immunity be
given to land in all cases? Is it really so sacred and immovable-except
at the hands of a force equal to the
once-wild Missouri-as centuries of
judicial interpretation have declared?
And does Minnesota really care,
for example, whether the farm on
the southwest corner of Shakopee is
owned by a Minnesotan or a Nebraskan? It clearly does not because citizens of every state can
and perhaps do own land in Minnesota. But does Minnesota really
care whether the title to that farm
is adjudicated in Nebraska or Minnesota?
The question in each case is
whether ther are sufficient grounds
of public policy for denying to the
determination of the court the effect of res judicata. Among the
factors that may enter into the
determination are: 22
(1) Whether the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
is clear or doubtful.
(2) Whether the determination
as to the jurisdiction depended upon questions of fact
or of law.
(3) Whether the court was one
of general or of limited jurisdiction.
(4) Whether the question of jurisdiction was actually litigated.
(5) The strength of the policy
underlying the denial to the
court of jurisdiction.
This last factor-strength of the
policy of undisturbed state jurisdiction over its own land-was the
crucial question in the Duke case.
It prompted Judge Blackmun's reversal in the Court of Appeals,
where he said:
. . . We are here concerned
with judicial disposition of real
estate and we are here confronted with the traditional
policy of imm.unity of a state's
real property from direct disposition by a sister state's judgment . . . It seems not mireasonable or iinproper, therefore, as a matter of policy
where land is concerned, to allow a court of the affected
state the opportunity to satisfy
itself as to the first forum's
subject-matter jurisdiction.20

Following the Baidwi,n case, the
Supreme Court soon made it clear
in a series of decisions-involving
such things as divorce, personal
property, and bankruptcy-that the
general rule is no different when the
claim is made that the original form
did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter.1° In each of these
cases the claim was made that a
court, when asked to enforce the
In equally forceful terms, the
judgment of another forum , was
free to retry the question of that other side of the argument was put
forum's jurisdiction over the sub- forward by Circuit Judge Matthes
ject matter. In each case the Su- in the Schroeder case:
The doctrine (or res judipreme Court held that since the
cata) is but a manifestation of
question of subject-matter jurisdicthe recognition that endless littion had been fully litigated in the
( Continued on page 5, col. 2)
original forum, the issue could not
10 11 L .Ed.2d 186.
1,288 U.S. 522 (1931).
Id. at- 525-526.
,o Da,·I " · frJvi . 305 1:.S. :12 (1938) :
toll ,·. Gottlieb. 305 t;.S. 10., (1938} ;
1'rel.nles '"· ~unsl1ine , lining Co .• 808 tr .
~6 (10-30 1 : Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U . .
343 (1948).
20 308 U.S. 66.
21 Id. at 78.
22 Restatement, Judgments, 10, comment
b (1942).
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PROFESSIONAL ATMOSPHERE .

Moot Court Prospers
by John E. McKendrick

William Mitchell's fourth year moot court course
is nearing completion of its most successful year. Again
under the direction of the Hon. Ronald E. Hachey
and Attorney Robert W. Gislason, the program has
offered an impressive succession of lectures, demonstrations, and other contacts with members of the
practicing bar and judiciary. All have been aimed at
encouraging individual participation of each student
in the course.
Foremost of a number of innovations was the presentation of a criminal appeal by four William
Mitchell seniors to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
which heard oral arguments sitting en bane. The four,
Sam Hanson and John F . Kelly representing defendant-appellant, Allan E. Mulligan and Gary Phleger
arguing on behalf of the State, were selected by their
classmates to make the trip to the State Capitol.
The appeal was particularly noteworthy in that its
special fact situation was contrived by John A. Cochrane, prominent St. Paul criminal defense attorney and
alumnus of William Mitchell. In drafting the facts,
special pains were taken to raise many of the vital
issues in the areas of criminal procedure and constitutional due process which are currently perplexing
courts all over the land. Because the Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet passed on many of these issues, the appeal assumed added significance.
Staggered betweeu an appeal and the two practice
trials which each tudent was required to prepare during the course of the year was a series of discussionlectures. Without exception, each of these sessions
was characterized by an abundance of "give-and-take"
between the participants and the students. The result was the dissemination of practical information
which, to a large extent, is unobtainable through the
use of books.
The fall sessions were directed primarily at the
"how-to" aspects of trying a lawsuit. Several of the
state's top trial lawyers participated. In one session,
Jerre Logan of St. Paul's Tyrrell, Jardine, Logan &
O'Brien and Robert J. King of the Minneapolis firm
of Hvass, Weisman & King led a question-answer discussion on both the defendant and plaintiff aspects of
presenting a case for trial. In a second session, William H. DeParcq of Minneapolis, representing the

plaintiff's viewpoint, and Sidney P. Gislason of New
Ulm, taking the side of the defendant, gave a talk on
the art of the closing argument.
Later in the fall semester, Minnesota's two youngest
Supreme Court Justices, Robert Sheran and Walter
Rogosheske, presented a highly informative discourse
on "practice and procedure in preparing for an appeal." Immediately after the Christmas recess, a final
lecture was given by law partners John A. Cochrane
and Douglas W. Thompson on changing facets in the
law as applied to the criminal defendant.
Highlighting the second semester _was the demonstration of a tax fraud case in the courtroom of Judge
Edward Devitt of the U.S. District Court. It was
the first time such a project had been undertaken
in the moot court program. Acting out the case for
the government was U.S. District Attorney Miles
Lord, while the taxpayer was represented by Hyam
Segal. The many hours of preparation volunteered by
these men, and by numerous government attorneys
who acted as witnesses, contributed greatly to the
success of the endeavor.
On dates subsequent to the federal court demonstration, the students heard instructive lectures from
John E. Peters, head of the Hennepin County Torens Office, who spoke on "procedure in registering
land," and Judge Archie Gingold and Referees Eugene
Burns and Charles O'Connell of the Ramsey County
Juvenile Court, who described the peculiar problems
in handling juvenile cases. Earl Parker, Deputy Clerk
of Court of Hennepin County and Ray Lerschen, excourt reporter, split a session in late spring to speak
on various aspects of their jobs.
Further supplementing the professional atmosphere
which has pervaded the moot court program was the
large array of Twin City judges and attorneys who
took their turns as judges at the students' practice
trials.
In co-ordinating the varied facets of this year's
moot court program, Judge Hachey and Bob Gislason
were understandably gratified by the "continued unselfish attitude of the practicing Bar and Judiciary,
who gave so freely of their time." But as also noted
by both, "the accelerated interest and participation
of the graduating seniors made improvement inevitable."

Bob Rahn Wins
OUTLAW . .. ( Continued from page 4)
igation leads to chaos; that
land and the plaintiff then brought
National Mention
certainty in legal relations must
an action in the Nebraska courts to
In ASCAP Contest he maintained; that after a quiet title. The Supreme Court,
by Gary Phleger

Bob Rahn, William Mitchell Senior who last October won the
$250 first prize in the 1964 Nathan
Burkan Memorial Competition at
Mitchell, has just been notified that
his paper was selected by the 1964
National Panel of Judges on March
22 for one of five "Special Mention"
citations.
In commenting
on the distinction,
Judge Carl McGowan, U.S. Court
of Appeals, District of Columbia
and panel member
remarked that
"These were paBob Rahn
pers of high merit
relating to subjects of a specialized nature .. ."
Stanley Adams, president of the
American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP)
had announced in October that Mr.
Rahn's paper entitled "Copyrighting of Insurance Rate Manuals:
Protection or Monopoly" was selected for the cash award as winner
f;om William Mitchell.
While at Mitchell Mr. Rahn has
served as Student Bar Association
Representative and Treasurer, and
as editor of the William Mitchell
Opinion. He received a Bachelor of
Science in Fire Protection and Safety Engineering from the Illinois Institute of Technology in 1954.
Mr. Rahn resides in Edina, Minnesota with his six children and
wife, Patricia. He is employed by
the Fire Underwriters Inspection
Bureau in Minneapolis and hopes
to enter a profession combining his
legal, insurance and engineering
training.

party has had his day in court,
justice, expediency and the
preservation of public tranquility requires the matter be
at an end."'

The same Court of Appeals, in a
dispute involving land in the St.
Louis River between Minnesota and
Wisconsin, in 1913 was almost confronted with the same question as
presented in Duke, but the conclusion on the merits in that case made
a jurisdictional decision unnecessary . 26 Yet, Minnesota's Supreme
Court has held--contrary to the old
English rule•• and still the majority
rule today-that an action will lie
in Minnesota to recover damages
for injuries to land situated in another state.
That was decided in Little v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and
Omaha Railway Co.,Z, where Justice
Mitchell said:
• . . An action for damages
to real property is on principle
just as transitory in its nature
as one on contract or for a
tort c0D1D1itted on the person
or personal property. The reparation is purely personal, and
for damages. Such an action is
purely personal, and in no
sense real."'

Although jurisdiction in the Little case was held to be personal,
courts can-in reality-affect title
to land in other states. For example,
if the court has jurisdiction of the
owner, he is ordered to execute a
conveyance of the land, and does so
to avoid contempt of court, it has
been held that such a deed is effective to pass title to foreign land.2°
This situation was carried ·one
step further in Fall v. Eastin,"'
where a Washington state court ordered the conveyance of Nebraska

however, held that the plaintiff had
misconceived her remedy in the Nebraska courts, but it almost certainly did not hold that Nebraska was
not required by full faith and credit
to give res judicata effect to the
Washington decree.
The Duke decision, it can be argued, is really a judicial detour to
circle historical roadblocks that Justice Mitchell pushed out of his way
in the Little case.
If that is true and if changing
conditions are causing the policy of
denying jurisdiction of foreign lands
to lose some of its strength, a Minnesotan who chooses to litigate in
Nebraska the title to his Minnesota
land should have as much right to
do so as to litigate the title to an
automobile, which Minnesota also
registers and derives some financial
benefit from in license fees, but
which the Minnesotan could also
take into the jurisdiction of the
Nebraska court.
All that such a land decree could
hold is that as against each other
and those in privity with them either the plaintiff or defendant is
entitled to the land.:n Such a decree
could not bind the situs state since
it was not a party to the suit.
Therefore, even if that state were
compelled to give the decree its res
judicata effect, there would be nothing to prevent- it from subsequently
ousting the successful party from
the land if such possession on his
part were contrary to its law.
Even without this argument, the
Duke and Schroeder opinions-by
their emphasis on putting an end to
litigation-indicate a strong policy
consideration for allowing a defendant to litigate the title to his land
in a foreign state, if he chooses to
do so and no statute stands in his
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Senior Sam Hanson to
Serve Justice Slieran
By Lee FossUin

After a privileged work record
and a stand-out academic career,
senior Sam Hanson's own special
charisma has earned him an appointment to serve as law clerk for
Minnesota Supreme Court Justice
Robert J. Sheran from August 1,
1965 to July 1, 1966.

Sam Hanson

Sam's duties as law clerk will inelude studying the records and
briefs of all cases under review to
isolate the issues for consideration,
and doing preliminary research on

those issues. He will reduce the re,.
suits to memorandum form for the
Justice being served. Sam will also
participate in the discussions in
which opinions are formulated by
the Justices, and will assist to a degree in the drafting of those opinions.
Each of the seven justices on the
Supreme Court employs a recent
law school graduate as law clerk,
the clerkship generally to be served
immediately following graduation.
Mr. Hanson earned a B ..\. degree
in history and economics from St.
Olaf college in 1961. His experience
while attending William Mitchell
College of Law has been what every
night law school advocate dreams
of-a broad and meaningful work
program related to the legal profession, combined with a rigorous formal legal education through classroom instruction .
Sam is presently employed as law
clerk for Judge Douglas K. Amdahl
of the Hennepin County District
Court. He was previously librarian
in the Court of Appeals Library and
prior to that had been Deputy Clerk
of District Court and Realty Assistant for the Department of Interior.

Dance, Style Show .

Law Wives Work Pays Off
1965 was a vintage year for William Mitchell law wives, under the
leadership of President Mrs. Don R.
Sjostrom.
The organization concentrated its
efforts on two events to raise money
for the Law Wives Scholarship
Fund. The first of these events was
the annual dance on which Chairman Mrs. Patrick O'Neill and her
ticket chairman, Mrs . C. J . Commers and Mrs. Richard R. Solie reported a profit of $250.
The other money raising event
was the annual style show. Under
the direction of Mrs. Asa Buttrick,
chairman, her ticket chairmen Mrs.
Ronald E. Erickson and Mrs. Jerome T. Anderson, this year's show
drew a capacity crowd of 500 at the
Thunderbird Motor Hotel. A grand
total of $325, a $150 increase over
1964 profits, was added to the scholarship fund.
A special introductory course in
law for law wives was taught this
year for the first time and was
very successful thanks to the efforts
of Mrs. Phil A. Gartner and her
committee. The class was taught
by Dean Heidenreich. It was open
to wives of Alumni as well as wives
of students. An additional scholarship of $200 will be offered next

year by law wives as a result of
profits from the class.
Law wives undertook to become
more involved in their charity project this year. April 10 they gave an
Easter party for 60 children at
Shriners' Hospital. Mrs. D. Wayne
Snyder, chairman of the project,
arranged for entertainment, favors
and a guest appearance by a local
children's TV celebrity.
Final stages are being reached in
the planning of the Junior-Senior
party. This event which is given
annually by Junior Wives for all
Seniors, their wives and parents
will be held June 11. Mrs. Phil A.
Gartner heads this event.
A banquet April 28 at Edgewater
Inn marks the end of a very exciting
first season of league bowling for
law wives.
And now instead of taking a
breather, law wives will work all
summer on a new project to raise
money for the William Mitchell Law
Wives Scholarship Fund. Mrs. John
L. Frost, Mrs. Donald L. Anderson
and Mrs. Eugene R. Ouradnik will
work with other law wives to compile The Law Wives Cookbook
which will be published in the fall.
It is estimated that net proceeds
from the sale of the book will reach
$1,000.

way, 32 and be bound by the foreign
court's determination. He would be
treated fairly because he is appearing by choice or because he is within
the jurisdiction of the court, and he
would not be bound if he did not
appear. There might be exceptions,
however, because interests of the
state or convenience in certain cases
might outweigh the interest of the
litigants in choosing their own forum. Generally, it would seem that
convenience and what interest the
state does have would best be
served by litigation of title in the
state in which the land is situated.
However, the Duke and Schroeder cases are portraits of judicial
scenes in which it would be unfair
to allow a litigant to seek his remedy in one state and then not be
bound by it if it fails to suit his
taste. To that extent, these two
cases indicate the continuation of a
jurisdictional trend that could move
the courts' power over land in many

cases to a basis closer to that of
personal jurisdiction.
!!3 308 F.2d at 219-220. A ccord, Huntingto n v. Attrill , HU U . . 65T ( l 92) . "'Proceed lairs in rem to determine ttie title to
lo.nd must n ecessarily be brought in the.
to.t,:, ,,.;tbia whose border th.e land j sJtonted. and whose courts and officers
aloue can put the party in possession."
"'318 F.2d 311.
25 Whiteside v.
Norton. 204 F. 5 (8th
Cir. 1013 ) . cert. d eni ed. 282 U . • i20; ap-

fu,at di!rni.isscd. 239 u _ . J ~.
"" Little , . Chicago, t. Paul. Minneapolis and Orne.ha Rallwny Co .• 65 Minn . .rs.
07 N .W . B16 (l 9U ) . Jll!lticc Mitchell stated
the old English rule this way: "".As an In·
jury to land can only oo committed wbcre
the lo.nd lies, It followed U,n.t. a ccording
to t bl test. action~ fur such iojuries were
held to be local."
27 Ibid.
:,s Ibid.
20 Deschenes v.
Tallman , 248 N.Y. 33,
161 N .E. 321 (1928).
oo 21;; ti.S. 1 ( 1900 ) .
a1 Reese, Full Falt h and Credit to Foreign Equ ity Decrees, -4 2 Iowa L. Rev. 183,

200 ( lU5i ) .

~ Sanders v. :Pa.clflc Gn/!1ble Robi n.son
C.,1., ~50 i\Un n . 2~li. 4 ~ .'\\ .~d 010 (19~, ). .
1n a bint that lack o! a statute might
rnu.ke f orclgn ji;1rlsdlction more palata.ble,
U1e MID:nesola upreme Court held in tb!S
case that n stote con e.'<ercise Jurisdlction
through its courts to direct II p_a rty- subject w the jurisdiction of the court t<;> do
an net in nnother state pro.-lded trurt
such an act is not contrary to Lbe Jaw
of the stn te in wh.leh it u; to be performed.
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Religion/Gov'L

ALUMNI NEWS
1917
CHARLES J. HEMMINGTON, 83,
Kittson County judge of probate for
more than 15 years, died at Hallock,
Minn.
Mr. Hemmington was born in the
Hallock area and was a member of
the first graduating class at Hallock
High School. From 1917 to 1920, he
served as county auditor for Kittson
County. He then practiced law at
Hallock and later was named to the
judgeship he held at the time of his
death.
He was a longtime Hallock School
Board member and had served as
treasurer of the board. He was also
an officer of the Presbyterian
Church at Hallock and an officer of
several district organizations of his
Church.
Mr. Hemmington had been reelected to his county office in November .

1919
A. I. LEVIN, 72, St. Paul, died
September 30, 1964. Mr. Levin practiced law in St. Paul for 45 years.
He resided at 1732 Pinehurst Ave.,
St. Paul.
Mr. Levin was born in St. Paul
on the spot where the Court House
now stands. He worked as an office
boy in a law office while at school.
Mr. Levin was a graduate of the
University of Minnesota. Upon his
admission to the Bar, he worked as
Deputy Clerk of Probate Court until he entered private practice in
1921. For the past thirteen years he
was associated with his son, Albert
Levin, as the senior partner.

a member of Burroughs Elementary criminal division of the county atSchool P.T.A. Mr. Anderson and torney's staff. Bloedel was formerfamily live at 4919 Colfax Ave. S., ly a corporation attorney.
GARRY W. FLAKNE was reMinneapolis.
1943
elected to the
Minnesota House
RICHARD J. PARISH 1s the
of Representatives
State Senator from
representing the
the 30th District.
35th District. He
He was first electis engaged in gened to the senate
. era! law practice
in 1963; before
in Minneapolis.
that he was a
His home address
state representative, 1959-1963. is 4901 11th Ave. So., Minneapolis.
He is past mem1961
ber of the Metropolitan Planning
WILLIAl\1 SCHINDLER, presentCommission and first president of ly practicin law in Jackson, Minnethe Metropolitan Suburban School sota, will be taking over the law
Board Association. In 1935 he re- practice of LaMont Seifert at Wells.
ceived a B.A. from Hamline Uni- He received a Bachelor of Arts Deversity.
gree in Philosophy from the St.
1953
Paul Seminary.
THEODORE J. SANDHOEFNER,
ROBERT H. MEIER has become
37, Claims Attorney for Casualty a member of the General Counsel's
Underwriters of St. Paul, died Sept. Staff of the American Medical As14, 1964, of cancer after an illness sociation, 535 N. Dearborn Street
of six months. He was born and Chicago. He is assigned to the De~
lived in St. Paul until 8 years ago partment of Investigation and will
when he moved to White Bear Lake. be re ponsible for th inve tigation
Mr. Sandhoefner served in the U .S. of H e~1 lth Fraud and Quackery .
Navy Submarine Service during His new home addt - i .J.O Elm
World War II.
Street, Glen Ellyn, Illinois. He was
formerly a member of the Chief
1956
RAYMOND PAVLAK was elected Attorney's Staff, V .A. Center at
to represent the Fort Snelling.

13th District
North in the State
Legislature. He is
practicing law in
South St. Paul
and is a graduate
of St. Thomas
College. He lives
1924
F. GORDON WRIGHT was re- at 1023 16th Ave. No., South St.
elected to the Minnesota House of Paul.
1957
Representatives. He has been the
State Representative from the 36th
JACK D eVAUGHN is practicing
District since 1955. Mr. Wright is law in M inneapolis. Eis business ada member of the law firm of Wright, dress is 1625 Park Ave.
Storlie & Wanglie, Minneapolis. A
DANIEL B. GALLAGHER has acmember of the Canadian Army for cepted a position as an attorney
five years, he is chairman, U.S. Na- with the Minnesota State Industrial
tional Council, Canadian Legion. Commission. He was formerly in
From 1945 to 1954 he was chair- practice at Waseca, Minnesota, and
man of the Legislative Committee was a Waseca municipal court
of the Minnesota State Bar Asso- judge.
1959
ciation. He is also director of the
Minnesota Society for the PrevenERNEST A. BEEDLE, State Reption of Blindness. His address is
resentative, is rep2912 Chowen Ave. So., Minneaporesenting the 46th
lis.
District South. He
1926
is a member of
the Beedle Law
J. NORMAN PETERSON is the
Firm, 221 Grand
Judge of Probate and Juvenile
Ave., West St.
Court at Long Prairie, Minnesota.
Paul. Mr. and
1934
Mrs . Beedle and
GERALD E. CARLSON an- their two children reside at 868
nounces that Donald F. Giblin Delaware, St. Paul.
(1964) has become associated with
KENNETH E. SCOTT represents
him in the practice of law at 32 the 10th District in the Minnesota
East Moreland Avenue, West St. House. A former claims examiner
Paul, Minnesota.
for the Agricultural Insurance
Group, he is presently practicing
1935
HAROLD J. ANDERSON has law in Fairmont, Minnesota. His
been representing the 37th District home address is 303 Woodland Ave.,
in the State Legislature since 1951. Fairmont.
1960
He is a member of the MinneapoPIDLIP J. BLOEDEL has relis law firm of Anderson, LeVander,
Zimpfer, Monson & Tierney. From signed as an assistant Hennepin
1942 to 1946, he was a special agent County attorney to go into private
for the F.B.I. He is also presently practice. He was assigned to the
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(Continued from page 3)

of religion. The Supreme Court did
not write an opinion but rather
merely cited the Sherbert case as
controlling. Following the reasoning
of the Sherbert case, it seems that
the United States Supreme Court
was convinced that there was no
showing in the jury case that excusing the woman from jury service would pose any practical hardship on the state. There was no
evidence that this new-found right
(not to have to serve on juries)
would be used (or abused) by citizens to an extent that would hami:er the jury system as a whole. The
rationale of these cases shows the
great difference in approach by the
court since the Gobitis decision. In
that case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
looked to the broad overall interest
of the state. He felt the interest of
the state was the ultimate interest
of national unity and security. Had
the court now wanted to look to the
broad interests they would have
considered the jury system as a
whole and the duties of citizens that
go hand in hand with the rights
guaranteed by the constitution.
These, however, were not the interests to be considered by the court.
The Supreme Court rather seems to
want the state to look at what will
be the practical effect if this woman
has her way. The interest of the
government to be considered is
whether there is going to be any particular immediate hardship on the
trial system if this woman is ex-

cused on the basis of her religious
freedom.
The standards set by the Supreme
Court in the Barnette case and restated by the United States District
Court in Arizona in the Sheldon
case have for the most part been
extended rather than limited. One
exception to this statement is the
decisions on the Sunday closing laws.
It is indeed difficult to distinguish
between the Braunfeld case and the
Sherbert case. The citizen in each
case is asked to choose between his
livelihood and his religious beliefs.
In the Sunday closing case the citizen is asking only for a chance to
earn his own living. In the unemployment compensation case, the
citizen refused to take a job which
would force her to violate her religious dictates, and she further
asks the state to support her in the
way of statutory benefits. If the
cases are to be distinguished it
must be on the basis of the attitude of the court toward the interest of the state. The result if
the retail merchants were to remain
open on Sunday would be to destroy
one of the good effects the statute
was intended to create. The overall relaxed, non-commercial atmosphere of the day of rest would be
gone. The court is thus considering
the present practical effect as the
interest of the state, and since this
would be impaired by allowing the
retail stores to remain open, the
right to free exercise of religion
must in this situation be secondary
to the peace and good order of the
society.

1962

R ONALD THOMAS was recently
app ointed t o the Hennepin County
attorney's office as an assistant
county attorney assigned to the
Domestic Relations Unit.

1963
WILLIAM N. BERNARD has
joined the Willmar, Minnesota law
firm of Davis & Strauman. He was
forme_rly employed as contract manager for the Univac Division of
Sperry Rand Corporation.

1964
JAMES D. GIBBS announces that
he is in the private practice of law
in association with Ward P . Gronfield. The offices are located at 556
40th Ave. N.E., Columbia Heights,
Minnesota .
RONALD R. FRAUENSHUH has
joined Rainer L. Weis in the practice of law at Paynesville, Minnesota. The firm will be known as
Weis & Frauenshuh.
RICHARD ARVOLD has become
associated with K. L. Wallace at
Alexandria, Minnesota.
PERRY L. WILLIAMS, formerly
with Mordaunt, Walstad, Cousineau & McGuire, announced his association with Richard Dobis under
the firm name of Dobis & Williams.
Their new offices are located at 3984
Central Avenue N.E., Columbia
Heights, Minnesota.
RONALD J. McGRAW has joined
the law firm of Donald Comer in
Hutchinson, Minnesota.
RICHARD F. NITZ has become
associated with the firm of Polkinghorn, Williams & Nelson. The firm
maintains offices in Fergus Falls
and Pelican Rapids.
JAMES TSCHIDA is with the
Minnesota Attorney General's staff
as a special assistant.
ARTHUR F. BLAUFUSS, form1
erly residing in St. Paul, has become associated in the firm known
as Meehl, Wiltrout & Franta with
law offices at 305 North 2nd. St.,
Marshall. The new firm will be
known as Meehl, Wiltrout, Franta
& Blaufuss. He was employed for
the last four years as a claimsman
for Main & Baker Co., in Minneapolis.
PATRICK S. LEARY is practicing
law in Marshall with the firm of
Quarnstrom & Doering. He was
formerly with State Farm Insurance Co.
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